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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This paper reviews the channels through which empowerment may improve the 
efficiency and quality of public service delivery, particularly in developing Asia. 
Departing from a macro perspective, we focus and revisit microeconomic 
evidence for three broad measures aimed at empowering the poor: 
empowerment through voice, empowerment through exit, and empowerment 
through information.  
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JEL Classification: Y30, H40 
  
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The provision of public goods is crucial to development: Access to basic services such as clean 
water and sanitation, transport, health care, and schooling not only increases individual well-
being but also serves as an input for aggregate production. Roads and telecommunication 
systems lower transaction costs and hence encourage trade and economic activity. The 
provision of health care and education increases the quality of human capital, an important input 
in knowledge-based economies.  
 
Due to the non-excludable and non-rival nature of public goods, however, competitive 
markets alone cannot guarantee the socially optimal level: As public goods generate positive 
externalities, private providers will tend to mutually free ride on the provision of others, resulting 
in a suboptimal level of public goods provided. This market failure is the traditional argument for 
intervention: The state is needed to provide the socially optimal level by equating marginal 
social benefit with marginal social cost.  
 
Despite the importance of public goods, there are large differences in delivery across the 
world. On this issue, the World Development Report (World Bank 2004a) has most prominently 
highlighted the large variation in both quality and quantity across a wide range of developing 
countries, pointing to challenges policy makers and frontline providers face. The report painted 
a grim picture of the state of public services, stating that “social services fail for the poor.” Nine 
years later after the publication of the report this review paper revisits the issue by focusing on 
the developments since then, paying particular attention to evidence and lessons for Asia.  
 
First, the paper provides a “big picture” by reviewing the trends and current state of 
public service delivery in Asia. To do this, we analyze general national and subnational trends in 
indicators to document the progress made since 2004 as well as the challenges ahead. Second, 
building on the conceptual framework of the World Development Report 2004, we discuss the 
various reasons for which public service delivery may fail, pointing to recent micro-level 
literature based on randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and natural experiments. Last, the paper 
explores three broad measures that are aimed at empowering the poor—empowerment through 
voice, empowerment through exit, and empowerment through information—providing more in-
depth case studies. Based on these studies, this review attempts to derive implications for 
future policy.  
 
 
II. BIG PICTURE – CHANGES SINCE 2004 
 
A. Cross-Country Trends and Differences 
 
What has changed since the World Development Report 2004? What are the current trends in 
Asia? We first review the macro-level evidence and then subnational trends. In terms of macro-
economic evidence, perhaps the most prominent composite measure for governance is the 
World Bank’s World Governance Index (WGI; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010).1 The 
WGI is a composite of several subindices that measures different dimensions of “governance,” 
ranging from empowerment (voice and accountability) to the provision of market-supporting 
                                                
1  Prior to the WGI, the World Bank offered a similar set of indicators—the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA)—from the late 1970s onward, assigning scores to economic management, structural policies, 
policies for social inclusion, public sector management, and institutions. These CPIAs, however, were only made 
publicly available in 2006 (World Bank 2011).  
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goods (political stability, absence of violence, and rule of law) as well as measures of the 
effectiveness in which these services are provided (government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, and control of corruption). The index ranges from around –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
indicating better quality of governance. 
 
In Figure 1, we plot the average change across the six subdimensions of the WGI 
between 2004 and 2011. The sample is restricted to the set of countries with Asian 
Development Bank operations.2 The figure reveals a very mixed picture: While some countries, 
such as Georgia, Indonesia, Vanuatu, and Tonga, have experienced substantial improvements 
in the governance indicators, others, such as Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, Afghanistan, and Fiji, 
have experienced a considerable deterioration in their index score. The picture is similar for the 
large Asian countries. India, for example, experienced a slight increase in its governance score, 
while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) experienced a decrease. In addition, there is also a 
wide range of stagnating countries that did not experience any major change between 2004 and 
2011.  
 
 
Figure 1: Average Change in the World Governance Index between 2004–2011 
 
 
AFG = Afghanistan, ARM = Armenia, AZE = Azerbaijan, BAN = Bangladesh, BHU = Bhutan, CAM = Cambodia,  
COO = Cook Islands, FIJ = Fiji, FSM = Federated States of Micronesia, GEO = Georgia, IND = India, INO = Indonesia,  
KAZ = Kazakhstan, KGZ = Kyrgyz Republic, KIR =Kiribati, LAO = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, MAL = Malaysia,  
MLD = Maldives, MON = Mongolia, MYA = Myanmar, NAU = Nauru, NEP = Nepal, PAK = Pakistan, PAL = Palau, PHI = Philippines, 
PNG = Papua New Guinea, PRC = People’s Republic of China, RMI = Marshall Islands, SAM = Samoa, SOL = Solomon Islands, 
SRI = Sri Lanka, TAJ = Tajikistan, THA = Thailand, TIM = Timor-Leste, TKM = Turkmenistan, TON = Tonga, TUV = Tuvalu,  
UZB = Uzbekistan, VAN = Vanuatu, VIE = Viet Nam, WGI = world governance index. 
Source: World Governance Indicators.  
 
 
Even though the WGI documents both positive and negative developments, these 
changes are—when taking measurement errors into account—relatively minor, indicating 
                                                
2  See http://www.adb.org/countries, retrieved on 15 January 2013. 
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stagnation for most of the Asian countries. Given the strong persistence of institutions 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Nunn 2009), however, it is not surprising that macro-
level indicators (that mostly capture institutional differences) appear to have remained roughly 
constant since 2004.  
 
Even though some Asian countries experienced an improvement in their governance 
score, the level of the governance index is still low compared to other regions. In Figure 2, we 
plot the average regional WGI scores in 2011 for selected regions. Compared with other 
regions, the average governance index is slightly poorer than the average for the Middle East 
and North Africa, while slightly better than the average of Sub-Saharan Africa. A direct 
comparison with North America or Europe,3 however, reveals the stark differences in the level of 
governance quality, suggesting considerable scope for improvement.  
 
 
Figure 2: Average Regional World Governance Index Score in 2011 
 
 
WGI = world governance index. 
Source: World Governance Indicators. 
 
 
B. Subregional Differences 
 
While the WGI is one of the most prominent indicators for governance and public service 
delivery, it has in recent years come under scrutiny (Pande and Udry 2005): First, as a country-
level indicator, the aggregation and averaging could mask a wide range of subnational changes. 
If governance improved substantially in one region and fell back in another, the changes may be 
offset when averaged across regions, resulting in a country-level indicator that suggests that no 
change occurred. Second, and perhaps more importantly, indicators such as the WGI are to a 
large part defined by subjective assessments. These perception-based indices are subject to 
unpredictable sampling and reporting bias (Sequeira 2012). Experts, for example, may expect 
                                                
3  The governance quality for Europe is comparably low, as it also includes a range of Eastern and Southern 
European countries with relatively low governance measures.  
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poorer countries to have poorer governance (“halo effect”). These biased beliefs will then 
translate into a biased indicator.  
 
Several alternative approaches exist to measure the quality of public service delivery. 
Among those, the World Bank’s Doing Business indicator (Djankov et al. 2002) considerably 
improves on the methodology. Instead of relying on perception-based assessments, the Doing 
Business indicator measures well-defined outcomes that proxy for certain dimensions of 
regulatory quality. Instead of asking for an assessment of the quality of legal enforcement or 
infrastructure, for example, the Doing Business indicator measures the days taken to enforce a 
business contract or obtain electricity. Similar outcome-based approaches are used to measure 
absenteeism or corruption: Unannounced random visits to schools and health centers, for 
example, are now established methods to estimate absence rates (Chaudhury et al. 2006; 
Kremer et al. 2009). Instead of relying on subjective assessments of corruption, public 
expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) are now widely used to follow the flow of funds (Reinikka 
and Svensson 2003; Koziol and Tolmie 2010). By measuring direct outcomes, and with the 
availability of subnational regional data, these measures provide a more fine-grained and 
accurate picture of the state of public goods provision.  
 
Even though subnational measures are only available for a small set of countries, these 
measures reveal considerable variation in the quality of public services within a given country. 
Table 1 shows the mean and measures of dispersion (variance and range) for two measures of 
public goods provision (enforcing contracts, registering property) based on subnational Doing 
Business indicators. While the large differences in means point to substantial cross-country 
differences in the quality of public goods provision, the measures of dispersion also reveal a 
large subnational variation: The range in the days needed to enforce a contract in the PRC, for 
example, is 428 days. In Nanjing, enforcement only takes about 112 days, while in Changchun it 
takes 540 days. Similarly, in India, enforcing a contract takes 600 days in Guwahati but 
1,420 days in Mumbai. The large standard deviations also point to substantial variation in the 
quality of public services within countries. 
 
 
Table 1: Subnational Differences in Government Effectiveness 
 
 Enforcing Contracts (days) Registering Property (days) 
 PRC ’08 India ’09 Pakistan ’10 PRC ‘08 India ’09 Pakistan ’10 Philippines ’11
Mean 319.06 961.05 1,260.76 52.4  54.94 41.69 36.52 
Standard 
deviation 
 89.33 218.08   392.58 13.84  29.90  7.00 13.96 
Range 428 820 1,460 50 102 22 59 
PRC = People’s Republic of China.  
Source: Doing Business Indicators 2013. 
 
 
C. Summary 
 
Overall, while the evidence reviewed suggests that countries have—on average—slightly 
improved, it is important to note that some countries have fallen back considerably. Among the 
countries in which the Asian Development Bank operates, Georgia and Indonesia have seen the 
largest improvements between 2004 and 2011, but countries such as Tuvalu, the Marshall 
Islands, and Thailand were amongst those experiencing the largest declines.  
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At the subnational level, the evidence also suggests that there remains substantial 
heterogeneity in the quantity and quality of services provided within countries: Subnational 
differences often dwarf cross-country differences, pointing to unequal provision of public 
services among regions.  
 
Finally, while both macro and subnational indicators allow us to track the trends over 
time, there remain problems with causality. As we are dealing with observational data, we can 
only examine suggestive correlations, but it is difficult to convincingly establish the drivers for 
the trends. While the dramatic improvement in Indonesia, for example, may be interpreted as 
the result of certain policies that were put in place since 2004, there are many other 
explanations that may be consistent with the same trend. As such, these observed trends alone 
cannot inform policy about how to improve. In the next section, we further focus by reviewing 
the RCT literature on particular types of empowerment interventions that may yield more 
insightful and credible policy implications.  
 
 
III. CHALLENGES IN PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION 
 
Despite improvements in many countries, there remain obstacles that ensure an efficient public 
goods provision. To conceptualize the different challenges, it is useful to depart from the 
framework of the World Development Report 2004 that traced the various channels through 
which the provision of public goods were determined and provided. The diagram below, 
reproduced from the World Development Report, summarizes the key relationships between the 
stakeholders in public service delivery: Citizen-clients voice their preferences about different 
public goods to the state. The state then aggregates these preferences and contracts providers 
to offer the services to the citizen-clients. The citizen-clients also have the possibility to 
influence the quality of services provided by directly exercising client power. Each of these 
stages, however, can be subject to substantial frictions. 
 
 
Figure 3: Routes of accountability (2004) 
 
 
Source: Reproduced from World Bank (2004a). 
  
Citizens/Clients
Coalitions/Inclusion
Nonpoor Poor
Providers
Frontline Organizations
Management
The state
Politicians Policy makers
Services
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A. The Public Choice Problem 
 
First, it is rarely the case that citizen-clients have a single voice. This gives rise to public choice 
problems, where heterogeneous groups (e.g., nonpoor and poor) compete to make their 
different interests heard by policy makers. The problem is particularly severe in developing 
countries with high fractionalization along dimensions such as ethnicity, religion, or culture.  
 
In recent years, the strong evidence for a negative relationship between fractionalization 
and macroeconomic outcomes (Putnam 1993; Easterly and Levine 1997; Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol 2003) has been corroborated by subnational and micro-level evidence. Alesina, Baqir, 
and Easterly (1999) were among the first to provide empirical evidence that links heterogeneity 
of preferences across ethnic groups in cities in the United States to the amount and type of 
public goods supplied. The authors found that ethnically diverse administrative areas have 
higher spending and higher deficits per capita, yet devote lower shares of spending to public 
goods such as education and infrastructure.  
 
While these results were based on suggestive correlations, similar results have been 
found using more credible identification strategies, such as recently by Algan, Hemet, and David 
(2011) in France, where the random allocation of ethnic groups within public housing blocks is 
used to overcome the econometric concern of endogenous residential sorting. The negative 
impact of heterogeneity and public service delivery is also found across a wide range of 
developing countries: In Kenya, Miguel and Gugerty (2005) find that ethnic diversity is 
associated with lower primary school funding, worse school facilities, and poor water-well 
maintenance. In Pakistan, Khwaja (2008) finds evidence that social fragmentation decreases 
the upkeep of local public goods. Similar findings from the PRC (Martinez-Bravo et al. 2011) 
and India (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2008) further add to the growing body of evidence.  
 
B. The Predatory State and Clientelism 
 
Second, even in the absence of the public choice problem, the state may not necessarily 
translate the voiced preferences of the citizen-clients into corresponding public policies. In 
contrast to traditional literature that saw the state as a benevolent actor, more recent political 
economy approaches explicitly take into account that the state itself may be pursuing own 
interests that may run against the interests of the broader population (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2005). A government that pursues clientelist policies, for example, may only adopt policies 
beneficial to a certain subgroup or divert resources away from one subgroup to the other. Since 
the poor often have disadvantaged access to articulate their political demands, clientelist 
policies are often biased toward the wealthy elite, obstructing pro-poor policies.  
 
In the African context, where clientelism is seen as particularly prevalent, Wantchekon 
(2003) presents experimental evidence from the presidential elections in Benin in 2001. The 
author identifies a set of electoral strongholds and then randomly assigned candidates to 
clientelistic appeals (making community-level promises) and national public appeals. Examining 
the subsequent voting outcomes, the author finds that clientelist appeals increase the share of 
votes received by 13.3 percentage points on average and are particularly effective for 
opposition candidates.  
 
Similar results of political capture are found in Asia. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) 
examine how pro-poor targeting varies with local inequality, poverty, or illiteracy within a 
decentralized implementation of development programs through the panchayats (local 
governments). While the authors do not find strong evidence of local elite capture in intra-village 
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allocation decisions, they find evidence of elite capture in inter-village allocation decisions: Local 
elites were hence more able to attract resources to their villages, instead of diverting them away 
from the poor within a village. An increase of 5% in the proportion of poor that were of low caste 
status is associated with a reduction of around 25% in per household grants allocated to the 
village. The comparative study by Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) documents similar forms of 
clientelism in a wider range of countries.  
 
C. The Cost of Corruption 
 
Third, contracted providers may have very different interests from the clients and the state, 
further aggravating the principal agent problem. Even when pro-poor policies are chosen, 
imperfect compliance with the targeting rule and corruption by the providers may reduce the 
effectiveness of the policies. Since the actual quality of the service provision is particularly 
difficult to monitor in remote and inaccessible areas, providers may shirk or decrease the quality 
of the services provided in those rural areas where the public goods are needed most.  
 
Corruption, broadly defined as the breaking of a rule by officials for private gain, is not 
only limited to the diversion of monetary funds but can take more nuanced forms such as “theft 
of time” (Banerjee, Hanna, and Mullainathan 2012). In the education sector, for example, 
contract teachers may weigh the cost of absence or shirking (the probability of punishment 
when detected) against the potential benefits (additional paid leisure time) when the intrinsic 
motivation of providing high quality education is low. This issue was prominently discussed in 
World Bank (2004a), and the evidence of poor quality education has considerably grown in 
recent years. A comprehensive study by Chaudhury et al. (2006) finds absence rates ranging 
from 11% in Peru to 27% in Uganda. Even if teachers are present, there is no guarantee that 
the education provided will be of high quality: Teachers who are evaluated based on test score 
outcomes of their students, for example, may decide to only teach to the test and reduce their 
effort in improving other dimensions of teaching (Glewwe, Nauman, and Kremer 2010; Figlio 
and Getzler 2002).  
 
The evidence suggests that the situation is even worse in health: Chaudhury and 
Hammer (2004) measured absence rates in Bangladeshi health centers. The absentee rates for 
doctors in larger clinics were found to be as high as 40%. In cases where monitoring was poor, 
absence rates were even higher: Single doctors posted to the most remote rural clinics were 
absent 74% of the time. For primary health centers, Chaudhury et al. (2006) find absence rates 
ranging from 25% in Peru to 40% in India, and Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo (2004) find absence 
rates of 45% in local health centers in rural Udaipur. Again, mere presence need not suggest a 
high quality of the health care provided: health workers may resort to rule-of-thumb decisions 
rather than following through with time-intensive diagnostic procedures, overmedicating 
patients. Das and Hammer (2004) evaluate the quality of doctors in Delhi by testing their ability 
to diagnose and treat a range of common illnesses: The authors presented doctors with a set of 
five hypothetical cases (vignettes) and asked how they would treat these cases. The average 
quality of doctors was found to be very low: For diarrhea, a common illness in developing 
countries, the probability that an average provider gives oral dehydration therapy—the correct 
treatment—is as low as 30%. Even if doctors were able to provide the correct treatments in the 
hypothetical cases, doctors often deviated from the textbooks treatments when treating real-life 
patients.  
 
In addition to shirking, contracted agents may actively divert economic resources away 
for private gain. If corruption is pervasive, few public funds may end up being used productively, 
even if the resources officially earmarked were substantial. Olken (2006) provides interesting 
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evidence from an Indonesian redistribution program. The study examines the Indonesian 
Operasi Pasar Khusus rice transfer program that was aimed at channeling subsidized rice to the 
poorest households. In order to detect corruption, the author compared the amount of rice 
officially reported as disbursed to a given village and district by the national government to the 
amount of rice households report to have received. The estimates based on the discrepancy 
between disbursed and received rice suggest that about 18%–30% of the rice allocated to a 
given village was lost due to corruption in the supply chain. The welfare loss is large: The 
author’s calculation suggests that corruption accounted for around 20% of the foregone welfare 
gain from the redistribution program. 
 
D. Why Empowerment Matters 
 
In all these cases, empowerment can improve public service delivery either directly or indirectly. 
First, empowerment increases the voice of the citizen-clients and accountability of the state. In a 
political system where corrupt politicians can be voted out of office, the incentives of politicians 
may be more aligned with the incentives of the citizen. In addition, allowing citizen-clients to 
choose the type and quantity of public goods provided through local elections or village 
committees may help overcome information problems as bureaucrats are often unaware of the 
priorities and needs of the poor.  
 
Second, empowerment also increases the client power vis-à-vis the providers. When 
clients can switch providers by “voting with their feet,” competition between different public 
service providers may yield efficiency gains. By improving the “outside option,” or alternatives, 
of citizen-clients, public service providers can be forced to make concessions. In addition, 
codifying the rights of citizen-clients may be another way to increase their bargaining power in 
relation to the providers. While citizen-clients living in informal housing may be reluctant to lobby 
for better access to infrastructure in fear of eviction, citizen-clients with formal tenancy 
agreements may be more likely to demand improvements in public service quality.  
 
Finally, greater accountability of the state also impacts the actions of the providers 
indirectly through the long route of accountability. When politicians are held accountable, both 
the choice of provider and mode of public service delivery may come under closer scrutiny, 
resulting in further efficiency gains. In the following, we will examine case studies that document 
three types of interventions that seek to empower the poor: empowerment through voice, 
empowerment by improving the bargaining power of the poor, and empowerment by providing 
information.  
 
 
IV. DEVELOPMENT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT – CASE STUDIES 
 
A. Empowerment through Voice 
 
1. Voice and Community-Based Monitoring 
 
There are two major barriers to empowering the citizen-clients to use their voice vis-à-vis the 
state and the public service providers. The first barrier is the lack of information about what 
constitutes an adequate level of public service. Citizen-clients may be unaware of their 
entitlements to services or lack a reference for comparison. Even if the poor quality of public 
services becomes a salient issue, the second barrier, lack of coordination and participation in 
monitoring, may prevent the citizen-clients to use their “voice.”  
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In order to evaluate the means to overcome these barriers, Bjorkman and Svensson 
(2009) study the impact of community-based monitoring of health care providers in Uganda. As 
a randomized controlled trial, the authors designed an intervention that was aimed to overcome 
both barriers to voice: lack of information and inadequate participation.  
 
The intervention encouraged participation in the community monitoring of health care 
providers using three rounds of meetings. During the first round of meetings, participants from 
the villages near the health centers are provided with report cards that outlined the quality of 
existing health services (e.g., utilization rates, absence rates) and compared them with other 
facilities. With staff from local nongovernment organizations (NGOs) acting as facilitators, the 
participants then discuss the issues and possible ways to improve health care provision. The 
second round of meetings, in turn, includes only the staff of the local health centers. Again, the 
staff from local NGOs act as facilitators and summarize the results of the village meetings. In 
the final meeting, members from both the community (chosen in the village meeting) and health 
workers meet to discuss suggestions for improvements. The participants then agree on a 
shared plan, outlining agreements about improvements and a monitoring plan.  
 
The intervention was designed as a one-off measure to encourage community 
participation and connect providers with clients, leaving the communities themselves to sustain 
community monitoring. Among 50 public rural health dispensaries chosen across Uganda, the 
authors randomly assigned half of the centers to receive the intervention, while the remaining 
half served as the control group. For treatment centers, the authors invited villagers within 5 
kilometers of the center to participate at the village events. To avoid elite capture, 
representatives were specifically recruited from a diverse background.  
 
The results suggest that treatment communities are significantly more involved in the 
monitoring of the providers. Consequently, health workers exerted more effort. Utilization rates 
in facilities with community monitoring increased by 20% and health outcomes, as measured by 
childbirth weight and child mortality, improved substantially 1 year after the intervention. The 
results are consistently positive across a wide range of outcomes: Immunization rates were 
higher, waiting times decreased, and absenteeism declined.  
 
The Uganda case study suggests that direct monitoring through the community can 
dramatically improve the provision of health services. In the Ugandan case, complaining 
formally through the long route of accountability is very costly: The lowest tier of 
administration—the health unit management committees themselves—has no authority to 
sanction workers. While the health subdistrict monitors funds and service delivery, it does not 
have the authority to dismiss workers. Only the district service commission is able to credibly 
sanction workers. While the formal way is long and ineffective, the results suggest that the direct 
route—community-based monitoring—has had an immediate and large positive effect.  
 
2. Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods 
 
One often neglected aspect in generating bottom–up decisions through community meetings, 
however, is who actually decides to attend these meetings. Even if community meetings are 
open to all, there are several reasons why the poor may be less likely to attend, leaving their 
voice unrepresented. The poor, for example, may be unaware of the meetings or unable to 
attend due to other constraints. Olken (2007), for example, illustrates a case of social norms as 
a constraint in rural Indonesia, where it is considered rude (particularly among the poor) to 
attend a village meeting without formal invitation. While the issue was overcome by explicitly 
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ensuring that minorities participated in the Ugandan village meetings, a general concern of 
community meetings is the possibility of elite capture.  
 
A natural alternative to community meetings, where village-level decisions are delegated 
to participants of the meetings, is the use of direct voting (or a plebiscite) as it allows a greater 
number of individuals to participate in the decision-making process. Olken (2010) provides 
evidence from an experiment in Indonesia that allows for a comparison between representative-
based meetings and election-based plebiscites. The experiment was conducted during 2005–
2006 in 49 Indonesian villages, each of which was preparing to apply for infrastructure projects 
of the Indonesian Kecamatan Development Program (KDP). The KDP allowed applying villages 
to propose a “general project” (a project that benefited the village as a whole) and a “women’s 
project” (a project that benefited only a subgroup of the entire village population).  
 
Randomly selected treatment villages implemented a direct election-based plebiscite, 
while control villages used community-based meetings to decide on which projects to submit for 
the KDP. The list of projects that was available for choice did not vary across treatment and 
control villages, and, given the randomization, any differences observed in choices and related 
outcomes could then be attributed to the direct voting policy.  
 
The results suggest that plebiscites, as a tool of direct participation in political decision 
making, can substantially increase satisfaction and the legitimacy of policies. While the final 
choice of the project to be implemented did not change significantly for the general project, 
women’s projects selected under the plebiscite were more likely to be located in poorer hamlets. 
This could be explained by the case that, under the community decision-making process, 
women from poorer hamlets were less likely to be involved and hence underrepresented. Even 
though the plebiscite did not change the resulting choice for both types of projects, simply 
allowing the wider population to decide via plebiscite increased satisfaction and the willingness 
to contribute to the projects. Villagers in treatment villages were 6 percentage points more likely 
to agree that the project chosen was in accordance with their own wishes, 12.6 percentage 
points more likely to agree that the project chosen will provide personal benefits, and 10 
percentage points more likely to be satisfied with the KDP overall. Finally, villagers in treatment 
villages were also 16.8 percentage points more likely to directly contribute their own resources 
to the project, suggesting a higher valuation of the projects chosen. 
 
Despite the positive evidence, however, even plebiscites, are prone to elite capture 
when turnout rates are not uniform across the population. For the Indonesian case, turnout was 
relatively high, at 79% on average. Compared to community-meeting decision-making, this 
implies that 20 times more people were involved in making decisions about the KDP projects. 
Enabling citizen-clients to directly vote for the projects hence appears to greatly increase the 
legitimacy of the projects ultimately chosen.  
 
B. Voice and Electoral Reforms 
 
If direct forms of participation, such as plebiscites, appear to have potential benefits, it raises the 
inevitable question about the implications of such results for countries that do not have fully 
democratic forms of political participation. The recent paper by Martinez-Bravo et al. (2011) 
which studies the introduction of local elections in rural PRC, hence, is particularly interesting: 
For one, it provides more empirical evidence of the effects of direct political participation in a 
different Asian context. For another, the findings hint that even gradual and limited democratic 
reforms may have sizable effects, providing more nuanced policy implications. In particular, the 
Development through Empowerment: Delivering Effective Public Services   І   11 
authors study the effects of the introduction of village-level elections in a nationally-
representative sample of 217 villages in the PRC between 1985–2005.  
 
Prior to the reform, members of the two main village-level institutions of governance—
the village committee and village party branch—were all appointed by the county government. 
The electoral reform introduced in the 1980s enabled villagers to select the members of the 
village committees.  
 
The PRC case is particularly interesting as the introduction of village-level elections 
constitutes a partial electoral reform that did not impose de jure constraints on the executive: Up 
to a second wave of reforms in 1998, villagers could not nominate candidates themselves; 
instead, candidates were still appointed by the party branch, hence enabling the government to 
keep a strong influence in the selection of committee members. While the elections enabled the 
villagers to punish poor-performing village committees by voting them out of office, the extent to 
which villagers could choose their representatives was still relatively limited.  
 
The reform was intended to impact public goods provision in two main ways: First, by 
allowing villagers to select among a set of candidates, the central government reduced its 
monitoring effort. Given the size and heterogeneity of the country, monitoring and appointing 
village committees were subject to large information costs. By transferring the burden of 
monitoring to the villagers, it was hoped that the increased local monitoring would impose 
checks on corrupt village committees. Second, enabling the villagers to select the village 
committees also helped legitimatize and enforce the implementation of policies decided by the 
central government.  
 
To identify the causal effect of the electoral reforms, the authors exploit its staggered 
implementation: As reforms were implemented in a top-down fashion in different provinces at 
different times, the strategy was to compare outcomes in villages before and after the 
introduction of elections, and between villages that had already introduced reforms and those 
that had not yet done so (known as the difference-in-differences approach). The results suggest 
that elections indeed increased public goods provision. Villages in which elections were 
introduced experienced, on average, an increase in public expenditures by 27%. In addition, the 
elections also appear to have led to policies that redistributed wealth from the rich to the poor 
through redistribution in household farmland and increases in wages paid by enterprises—two 
policies that were under direct control of the village.  
 
The authors argue that the effect is mainly due to improved leader incentives and not 
due to villagers’ ability to better select candidates. First, comparing the impact of elections 
before and after nominations were opened up, the authors find no significant difference, 
suggesting that the ability to nominate candidates had little additional impact. Second, the effect 
of elections does not differ across elections that experienced a turnover after the first election to 
elections that did not experience a turnover.  
 
The three papers surveyed here provide valuable lessons for policy. First, by designing 
better mechanisms of community-based action, it is possible to substantially improve the 
outcome of public service provision. The greater monitoring in the Ugandan case ensured the 
public resources were more efficiently employed and did not impose a greater financial burden 
on the government. Second, while the researchers ensured that the participants of the 
community meetings were representative of all groups within the villages, such meetings may 
have been prone to elite capture when the poor are less likely to attend or speak up during the 
events. Here, the evidence from Indonesia suggests that implementing direct voting 
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mechanisms, while not dramatically changing the policy choices made, led to greater 
satisfaction, valuation, and legitimation of the projects ultimately implemented. Third, the policy 
implications may be more nuanced than just recommending decentralization or democratization: 
The PRC case of village-level reforms suggests that even partial reforms can have substantial 
positive effects.  
 
C. Improving the Bargaining Power of the Poor 
 
1. Increasing Tenure Security in Rural Areas 
 
Another major problem in the developing world is the prevalence of informal tenancy 
relationships: In many rural areas, tenancy and sharecropping relationships are not explicitly 
defined. In urban areas, structural change and migration have resulted in a large number of 
poor who are forced to live in marginal squatter settlements with constant threat of eviction  
(UN-HABITAT 2003). Empowering the poor by strengthening tenure security, hence, may be a 
potential policy to indirectly improve the quality of public service provision.  
 
Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak (2002) study the impact of a large tenancy reform in  
West Bengal, India. Operation Barga, implemented in 1977, was motivated by the poor 
implementation of previous tenancy laws, which kept tenancy relationships insecure. A survey 
conducted by the authors in rural West Bengal suggests that, prior to the reform, 74% of the 
leases did not have a specified duration. In addition, 80% of the respondents reported to have 
been subject to eviction threats.  
 
The aim of Operation Barga was to improve and enforce the rights of these tenants. 
Under the new regulation, registered tenants were entitled to permanent and inheritable tenure 
on the land they sharecropped, provided they paid at least 25% of the output as rent. In 
addition, registration was made easier by Operation Barga officials who actively provided 
information to hesitant sharecroppers. The enforcement of the tenancy laws was monitored by 
the local government.  
 
In theory, such a tenancy reform empowers sharecroppers in several ways. First, the 
reform increases the bargaining power of tenants by prohibiting arbitrary eviction. The increased 
bargaining power can then translate into better contractual terms, such as a higher crop share. 
Second, the reform increases the security of tenure. On the one hand, the greater security 
ensures that tenants reap the benefits of their effort, hence allowing them to make greater 
investments (“carrots”). On the other hand, landlords could no longer “motivate” tenants to exert 
efforts by threatening them with eviction (“sticks”). While the bargaining effect has an 
unambiguously impact, the tenure security effect depends on which of the two channels 
(“carrots” vs. “sticks”) dominates. 
 
Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak (2002) evaluate the impact of Operation Barga using both 
interstate and intrastate evidence. First, the authors use a difference-in-differences design to 
compare the pre and post trends in West Bengal to the trends in Bangladesh, a neighboring 
state with similar conditions and trends which, however, was not subject to a tenancy reform. 
Second, the authors exploit variations in program intensity within West Bengal to test if districts 
with a higher number of registered sharecroppers experience higher subsequent productivity 
growth.  
 
The authors find evidence that Operation Barga indeed improved the position of the 
tenants. After the reform, 96% of respondents surveyed reported that evicting registered tenants 
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is nearly impossible. Only 30% of the respondents knew tenants who were evicted after the 
reform. The increased bargaining power of the tenants is also associated with an improvement 
in contractual terms. Post-reform, the proportion of tenants getting more than 50% of the output 
increased from 17% to 39%. Finally, the empowerment of tenants also increased agricultural 
productivity: rice yields in post-reform West Bengal were about 7%–18% higher than in 
Bangladesh. In addition, districts with higher sharecropper registration rates also had higher 
subsequent yields. In total, the authors estimate that the reform accounts for about 28% of the 
subsequent growth in agricultural productivity in West Bengal. 
 
The paper, providing evidence from one particular tenancy reform, shows that the impact 
of empowering tenants depends strongly on their initial position: If the empowerment is not far-
reaching enough, the positive effect of improved security (“carrots”) may not be offset by the 
negative effect (“sticks”). Acknowledging the presence of nonlinear effects in such interventions 
is hence important for conducting welfare analysis. Perhaps most importantly, the case of 
Operation Barga also shows that there need not necessarily be a trade-off between equity and 
efficiency when designing programs that transfer property rights from the rich to the poor.  
 
2. Increasing Tenure Security in Urban Areas 
 
Field (2007) provides another compelling piece of evidence documenting positive effects of 
formalizing insecure land titles in urban areas. The author studies the impact of a large-scale 
titling scheme in Peru. The scheme made it easier for informal residents to formalize their 
tenancy relationship. With nearly 1.2 million titles issued between 1996 and 2003, it is 
considered one of the largest titling schemes for urban squatters in the developing world.  
 
In contrast to the Indian case that focused on tenancy relationships in rural areas, the 
Peruvian titling scheme was aimed at addressing the growing informal urban settlements on 
unused government lands that arose from the inability of cities to cope with the increasing 
urbanization. In 1997, the World Bank (1997) estimated that over 25% of Peru’s urban 
population lived in informal urban settlements. 
 
As in the Indian case, formalizing a title was costly prior to the reforms. Registering a title 
involved lengthy bureaucratic processes and often high fees. The intervention sought to 
facilitate the lengthy registration process. Under the new scheme, registration was effectively 
free and rapid. Similar to the Indian case, project teams were set up locally and claimants could 
receive their title provided they could verify their residence predating the start of the program. 
The program was implemented sequentially. 
 
Once more, there are two possible effects at work. First, formalizing a title can increase 
the bargaining power of the poor in several ways. On the one hand, with a formal title, residents 
may be able to overcome credit frictions by using their title as collateral, a channel often dubbed 
the “de Soto effect.” On the other, as legal residents, the poor may be able to lobby for the 
provision of better public goods (e.g., piped water, roads) without fear of being evicted. Second, 
a formal title has a security of tenure effect: when a claim on a property is informal, residents 
may be reluctant to invest in the property and spend considerable resources in protecting the 
property. Residents who are forced to stay nearby their property, for example, will forego 
potentially lucrative job opportunities that are offered in more remote parts of the city. 
Formalizing the claim, hence, may provide incentives to invest and free up resources previously 
devoted to guarding the land.  
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Field (2007) evaluates the security of tenure effect by exploiting the sequential 
implementation of the program. By arguing that the exact sequence of titling was quasi-random, 
the strategy is to compare the outcome in titled areas by using the untitled areas as the 
counterfactual. Her findings suggest that the titling scheme had positive impacts. After the 
reform, 98% of squatters reported experiencing a change in tenure security. The intervention 
impacted labor supply decisions in three ways: First, the intervention resulted in a reallocation of 
labor from time spent guarding the property to working by 13.4 hours per week. Second, the 
increased security of tenure resulted in a shift away from home production to work in the 
market, with titled households 40% less likely to work at home. Third, with the freeing up from 
guarding duties, titling resulted in a significant decrease in child labor. Instead of guarding the 
property and sending children to work, adults in titled households were more likely to work 
themselves.  
 
3. Improving Bargaining Power vis-à-vis Lenders  
 
In addition to the security of tenure effect of entitling the poor, facilitating collateralization of the 
title may help the poor overcome credit constraints (the so-called “de Soto effect”). Enabling the 
credit constraint to borrow gives the poor opportunity to undertake profitable investments. As 
before, however, the effect may not be unambiguously positive.  
 
Besley, Burchardi, and Ghatak (2012) suggest that the provision of better property rights 
and titles is likely to have heterogeneous effects that vary depending on the initial wealth level, 
the extent to which property rights are improved, and the structure of the credit market. The 
authors introduce a simple lender–borrower framework to illustrate the mechanisms involved. 
The underlying factor that determines the mechanisms for property rights reforms is the outside 
option of the borrower: When the borrower has no alternative but to borrow from the lender in 
order to undertake his or her investments, improving property rights may be harmful to the 
borrower. As property rights improve (e.g., the borrower has formalized the title on his or her 
land), lenders are now able to seize a greater share of the borrower’s wealth in case of default 
by increasing the interest payments. In this case, improvements in property rights benefit the 
lenders at the expense of the borrowers. The property rights reform would only induce 
redistribution. As lenders are typically wealthier than the borrowers, the redistribution would not 
be pro-poor.  
 
When the borrower’s outside option is sufficiently high such that the borrower does not 
need to rely on borrowing from the lender, however, improvements in property rights indeed 
facilitate access to credit by lowering the interest rates, the “de Soto effect.” The effect is driven 
by two channels: First, as the borrower can always fall back on his or her outside option, lenders 
will need to make concessions by lowering the interest rate. Second, improved property rights 
allow the borrower to collaterize a larger share of the wealth. Since the loss incurred in case of 
default also increases, borrowers will increase their effort. The combined effect of both lowers 
the interest rate and increases effort and subsequent production.  
 
In order to evaluate how large these heterogeneous effects are empirically, Besley, 
Burchardi, and Ghatak (2012) calibrate their model using data obtained from a microenterprise 
survey in Sri Lanka. The authors estimate the key parameters of their model using structural 
equations and indeed find that the magnitude of the “de Soto effect” varies substantially across 
wealth levels. When reestimating the parameters based on a similar dataset in Ghana, the 
results suggest that the expected effects are very dissimilar due to differences in the wealth 
distribution. Both the theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence hence serve as another 
reminder that context matters when designing policy reforms. In the Sri Lankan case, for 
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example, improvements in property rights initially lead to an increase in interest rates. Only after 
the improvements in property rights exceed a threshold such that the borrower’s outside option 
is binding does the positive “de Soto effect” decrease the interest rates. In this case, for property 
right reforms to improve the situation of the poor, the improvement would need to be large 
enough so lenders—facing an empowered borrower who can opt out for his or her outside 
option—are forced to lower interest rates.  
 
D. Empowerment through Better Information 
 
1. Addressing Absence Rates through Monitoring 
 
As prominently highlighted in the World Development Report 2004, the quality of public services 
is particularly low for the poor. Common manifestations of poor service delivery across the world 
are long waiting times, limited attention, differential treatment, and high absence rates. 
 
In order to address the poor quality of public service delivery, it is important to study the 
incentives of agents involved. For the delivery of basic education, Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan 
(2013) conducted a randomized experiment in rural India (Udaipur) to test if monitoring and 
incentives help reduce teacher absences and improve learning outcomes. In the context 
studied, basic primary schooling was delivered by an NGO through contracted short-term 
teachers (so-called para-teachers) in nonformal education centers. Since these teachers were 
employed flexibly with no prospect of permanent employment, there was little monetary 
incentive for the teachers to exert efforts. This situation was further aggravated by the fact that 
the schools were based in rural areas that were hard to access. Low incentives, coupled with 
low risk of punishment, hence resulted in high absence rates. The baseline survey in 2003, 
where absenteeism was verified through random visits, revealed an absence rate of 35%. 
 
The intervention studied addressed both incentives and monitoring. To improve 
monitoring, teachers were given a camera with tamperproof time stamps and asked to provide 
evidence of their attendance by taking a picture in the morning and the evening. Pictures taken 
with at least eight students and 5 hours in between qualified as being “present.” In addition, to 
provide incentives for attendance, salaries were pegged to the attendance rates in a nonlinear 
fashion: Teachers earned a fixed salary of Rs500 but would gain a bonus of Rs50 for each 
additional day taught in excess of a 10-day minimum.4 Out of 120 schools, half of the schools 
were randomly selected to implement this scheme. The remaining schools served as the 
comparison group, where teachers earned a fixed salary of Rs1,000.  
 
The results suggest that monitoring and financial incentives reduce teacher absences 
and increase learning. In treatment schools, absenteeism fell by 21 percentage points relative to 
the control group. The treatment improved attendance across the distribution, with the impact 
largest for below-median teachers (as evaluated using a teacher skill exam). While below-
median teachers initially exhibited lower attendance rates than above-median teachers, the 
program brought below-median teachers to the same (higher) level as above-median teachers. 
The higher attendance rates also translated into higher test scores. Test scores in treatment 
schools improved by 0.17 standard deviations. Children from treatment schools were also 10 
percentage points more likely to transfer to formal primary schools. Finally, the impact of the 
intervention was long-lasting and there is no evidence that the results were driven by Hawthorne 
effects (observer-expectancy effects). After 4 years, teacher absences were still 11 percentage 
points lower in treatment schools.  
                                                
4  Since all teachers were reminded of their duty to teach, the salary paid for additional attendance must be 
interpreted as a bonus.  
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The study allows a close look at the mechanisms at work. The authors use a structural 
model to disentangle the combined effect of monitoring and incentives, and estimate the 
responsiveness of teachers to financial incentives. The estimates suggest that teachers are 
responsive to incentives, with elasticities of labor supply with respect to the level of financial 
bonus between 0.2–0.3. Based on additional data collected during school visits, it is also 
possible to explore how the increased attendance improves schooling outcomes. The evidence 
suggests that the higher attendance rates directly translate into longer hours of instruction for 
the students, which in turn are likely to have improved the test scores. Conditional on the school 
being open, teachers were as likely to teach and students as likely to attend across treatment 
and comparison schools. This suggests that the fixed cost of attending is the major determinant 
driving teacher absence rates, as the marginal cost of teaching appears to be relatively low.  
 
Several lessons arise from this study. First, monitoring is effective but only if coupled 
with incentives. Absent credible consequences (higher salary, layoff), monitoring alone may not 
have a large impact on absence rates. Second, when designing incentives, it is necessary that 
incentives are high-powered enough to have an economically large impact. In the case studied, 
the fixed cost of going to work appears to be the main barrier, and sufficiently high-powered 
incentives are required to offset the fixed cost. In other contexts, however, the elasticities of 
labor supply with respect to financial incentives may be very different, so the results must be 
interpreted with care when trying to extrapolate to other services or countries. Finally, the study 
demonstrates that the creative use of technology can help overcome challenges faced in 
program design. The use of time-stamp cameras and bottom–up monitoring is just one 
example—in another context, different technological tools may be more adequate.  
 
2. Providing Information to Facilitate Community Action 
 
Another way to facilitate bottom–up monitoring is to empower the citizen by providing 
information. Reinikka and Svensson (2011) provide evidence from Ugandan primary schools 
that may also provide useful lessons for improving governance in Asian countries.  
 
In Uganda, as common in many countries throughout the developing world, capitation 
grants for the education sector (resources for financing instructional material and nonwage 
spending) are set nationally and allocated annually on a per student basis. Disbursed several 
times over a year, these funds were provided—either in kind or as direct financial transfers—
from the national government to the local district officials who then channeled the funds to the 
schools. A public expenditure tracking survey in 1996, which followed the flow of resources from 
the national level to the schools, however, found that only 24% of the total yearly capitation 
grants actually reached the schools, with even lower rates in poor areas. There was little 
evidence to suggest that the funds have been diverted away for other productive purposes (e.g., 
to increase health spending), and the main concern was that local district officials diverted the 
money away to nonproductive consumption.  
 
In response to the startling numbers, the Ugandan government launched an information 
campaign toward the end of 1997, publishing information on monthly transfers of capitation 
grants allocated to districts in local newspapers. The newspapers were asked to publish 
detailed data on the amount and timing of transfers to the districts. In addition, information about 
schools’ entitlements and responsibilities, including anecdotal cases of embezzlement by local 
politicians were regularly reported. The main goal was to increase the awareness both of 
schools and citizens, encouraging the use of “voice” to address the allocative inefficiencies.  
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In order to identify the causal impact, the authors examine whether schools closer to 
newspaper outlets are more likely to be better informed after the policy change in 1997. The 
authors find that, after the reform, schools closer to newspaper outlets reported significantly 
higher shares of the disbursed capital grants received than schools further away from 
newspaper outlets (hence, less likely to receive the information). Using the distance to 
newspaper outlets as an instrumental variable and controlling for school fixed effects, the 
authors find that this increase in funds received translated into better educational outcomes, 
increasing enrollment rates as well as slightly improving test scores. In terms of magnitude, the 
impact of the information campaign had almost the same magnitude as more cost-effective 
schooling interventions (Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton 2009).  
 
The information campaign suggests that improvements in governance driven by voice 
and increasing monitoring alone can help improve the delivery of education. In this case, the 
provision of better information lowered corruption and hence increased the efficiency of the 
service delivery channel. Head teachers serving close to newspaper outlets were better 
informed both about the allocation rules for the capitation grant and the timing of the 
disbursement. Among the schools that did not receive the full amount in 2001, 47% complained 
both through informal (e.g., verbal complaints) and formal channels (e.g., electoral sanctions), 
suggesting that the information indeed translated into action.  
 
While the case study suggests that providing information is a cost-effective way to 
improve the use of public funds, it is not clear, however, which measure ultimately helped 
decrease corruption. The policy itself comprised a range of interventions (revealing amount of 
funds disbursed, increasing awareness about corruption, and providing anecdotal evidence of 
embezzlement), and it is unresolved whether all three measures are complementary and 
required, or if one of these interventions alone would be sufficiently effective in reducing 
corruption. In addition, even though the intervention empowered schools and citizens, it is 
unclear if a similarly designed information campaign would result in comparable improvements 
in governance through bottom–up pressure. In the Ugandan context, the authors stress that 
collective action problems may be easier to solve as parents have long been organized and 
involved in the management of primary schools. Similarly, it is unclear if the findings apply to 
other public services. To the extent that education is perceived a more sensitive and important 
service than health or infrastructure, revealing the extent of corruption may be more likely to 
trigger the desired collective action. The negative association between missing education funds 
and education outcomes, however, has been found in other contexts (e.g., Ferraz, Finan, and 
Moreira 2012 in Latin America), so improving governance appears to have an unambiguously 
positive impact.  
 
3. Exposing Corrupt Officials 
 
The study by Ferraz and Finan (2008) looks deeper into the channels on how citizens react to 
the arrival of new information, and how the reaction translates into political outcomes.  
 
The authors study the impact of a Brazilian anticorruption program on electoral 
outcomes. Launched in 2003, the federal government began to select municipalities at random 
to audit their expenditures of federally transferred funds. Randomly selected municipalities then 
undergo an extensive check by a team of independent auditors. A team of 10–15 auditors is 
sent to examine accounts as well as inspect the quality of public work and delivery of public 
services. These auditors also meet with members of the local community to hear direct 
complaints. The resulting report then describes all irregularities found and is then published 
online and disseminated through media sources.  
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The authors exploit the random selection and timing of the public dissemination by 
comparing electoral outcomes of mayors eligible for reelection between municipalities audited 
before and after the 2004 elections. Since the timing of audits is quasi-random, any significant 
difference in electoral outcomes between municipalities where the audits were released before 
and after the election would suggest that the release of information significantly changed voting 
behavior. The main interest lies in how electoral outcomes compare based on the type of 
information disclosed (high/low corruption), and whether the effect varies with the presence of 
local radio.  
 
The results suggest that the audit had a significant impact on the incumbents’ electoral 
performance. Among municipalities in which two violations were reported, the audit reduced the 
likelihood of reelection by 7 percentage points. In contrast, when corruption was not found, the 
audit increased the likelihood of reelection by 9 percentage points. Once empowered with 
information, citizens update their beliefs, punishing corrupt politicians and rewarding compliant 
politicians at the polls. As in the study in Uganda, the media plays an important role in 
disseminating information. In those municipalities with local radio stations, the effect of 
disclosing corruption on the incumbents’ likelihood of reelection was most severe, decreasing by 
11 percentage points. Similarly, when corruption was not found in a municipality with a local 
radio station, the audit increased the likelihood of reelection by 17 percentage points.  
 
The results suggest that improved monitoring of politicians via random audits and the 
dissemination of the audit results improves political accountability—and ultimately governance. 
Non-corrupt politicians are more likely to be promoted, while corrupt politicians are more likely to 
be voted out of office. While the study only examines the immediate effect of the audit scheme 
on a single election, it is likely that the probability of being audited (monitoring) coupled with the 
threat of being punished at the polls (incentives) have an overall impact on decreasing 
corruption.  
 
The study, however, also shows that context matters greatly. While newspapers were 
the main source of information dissemination in Uganda, they are not an important source of 
local news. In a country with the lowest worldwide newspaper penetration rate, local radio 
serves as the main source of information. When considering designing similar audit schemes 
that heavily rely on information, it is crucial to adjust the vehicle of dissemination to the local 
context. In addition, the extent to which similar schemes work in other countries strongly 
depends on the political institutions. In Brazil, for example, voting is compulsory and the high 
political participation may be partly driving the results. In the absence of compulsory voting, 
when the poor and uneducated are less likely to vote, audit results may have a smaller impact 
on voting outcomes. Finally, it is important to take into account the incentives of the auditors. In 
the Brazilian context, the auditors are hired based on competitive public examinations and paid 
competitive salaries to prevent misreporting and bribe-taking. While the authors do not find any 
evidence for deliberate manipulation of audit results, ensuring that auditors are not susceptible 
to corruption is clearly an essential prerequisite.  
 
E. Female Empowerment and Governance 
 
Gender equality is a crucial part of empowerment: The importance of female empowerment is 
perhaps best summarized by the conclusion of the recent World Development Report 2012 that 
“gender equality is a core development objective in its own right” (World Bank 2012). In addition 
to promoting female empowerment for normative purposes of equity, a common rationale lies in 
efficiency gains. On the one hand, the gender gap in health, education, and political 
participation and employment opportunities reflects a welfare loss as a large pool of talent 
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remains untapped (Duflo 2012). On the other, political empowerment of women may also be 
conducive to more representative decision making and better governance (World Bank 2012).  
 
The importance of “gender” in efficiency and service delivery can be traced back to early 
work on intra-household allocation. The seminal work by Udry (1996) on household risk-sharing 
provided initial evidence that agricultural households in developing countries do not appear to 
act and optimize as a unitary household. While benchmark models of risk sharing would predict 
that factors be allocated efficiently across all plots owned by a given household, the author’s 
case study in Burkina Faso finds that plots controlled by women are less intensively farmed than 
similar plots within the same household controlled by men. In this context, the inefficient 
allocation of resources within a household implied a substantial loss of output by around 6%. 
Similar results are found in a subsequent study of land investments in Ghana, where wives 
achieve much lower profits than their husbands, even though an efficient household would seek 
to equalize returns to cultivation across all plots (Goldstein and Udry 2008).  
 
As a consequence of the finding that households do not act as a single unit, policies that 
aim to target women—the predominantly disadvantaged household member—have gained 
much attention in public policy, with examples abounding. Large-scale conditional cash transfer 
programs such as Mexico’s PROGRESA/Oportunidades, for example, exclusively provide cash 
transfers to female household heads. Similarly, micro-loans offered by the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh target female household members. The notion that female empowerment is 
conducive to development and governance has also been extended beyond the household. 
Moore (1999), for example, reports a case where the police chief in Mexico City, in hope to 
reduce corruption, transferred the ticket-writing authority exclusively to female traffic officers. 
Other female-focused policies include the introduction of female quotas in enterprises (Bertrand, 
2013) or in political representation (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). Implicit to these 
interventions, however, is the assumption that gender is a critical dimension that determines the 
effectiveness of policies and the quality of governance.  
 
1. The Differential Effect of Targeting Women 
 
Duflo (2003) provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that the gender of the recipients 
affects the effectiveness of social transfers. The author exploits the expansion of the South 
African social pension program to the black population to study the impact of the cash transfer 
on the well-being of the (grand)children living in the household, paying particular attention to 
how the effect varies across the gender of the recipient (i.e., whether the grandmother or 
grandfather received the pension).  
 
The author uses a regression discontinuity design to identify the impact of the gender-
specific cash transfer. Since only women above 60 and men above 65 were eligible, the 
identification strategy compares the well-being of children living with grandparents just below 
the eligibility cutoffs to children living with grandparents just above the eligibility cutoffs. To the 
extent that these households are comparable (apart from the fact that some fell above the cutoff 
and hence received the cash transfer, while others fell just below the cutoff and hence did not 
yet receive the transfer), comparing outcomes of these two groups allows the researcher to 
identify the causal impact of the intervention.  
 
The results suggest that pensions received by women increased weight-for-height (a 
short-run health outcome) by 1.19 standard deviations but did not significantly benefit boys. 
Pensions received by men, in contrast, did not have any effect on the nutritional status of either 
girl or boy.  
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Since living with a grandmother or a grandfather per se could affect the health outcome 
through channels other than the pension scheme, Duflo (2003) corroborates the results using a 
difference-in-differences specification that exploits the longitudinal dimension implicit in a child’s 
height to remove unobservable time-invariant confounds. Since the height-for-age of a child is a 
function of the whole nutrition history, the intuition of the difference-in-differences is to use older 
children as a control group for younger children. If the pension improved the outcome of the 
children living with the recipients, we would expect older children in eligible households to be 
smaller and younger children to be larger compared to the non-eligible group (since the younger 
children would be exposed to the program for a longer time). Again, the author finds that 
pensions received by women increase the health outcome (i.e., height-for-age) of girls but have 
no impact on outcomes of boys. Similarly, pensions received by men have no impact on either 
grandchild.  
 
While the finding suggests that the efficiency of a transfer program may vary with the 
person targeted within the household, Duflo (2003) does not offer a conclusive explanation for 
the heterogeneous and gender-specific effect observed. One plausible explanation would be 
that the preferences of women differ from those of men, and that empowering the grandmothers 
through the direct cash transfer increases the likelihood that these preferences are translated 
into action.  
 
Indeed, the findings of Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) provide direct evidence for 
gender-specific preferences. Collecting data on the types of complaints by men and women to 
the local village councils in two rural districts in West Bengal and Rajasthan, India, the authors 
find that the types of complaints differ significantly by gender. Women, for example, were more 
likely to complain about drinking water, while men complained more about roads. As Duflo 
(2012) points out, these differences in complaints appear to be driven by the gender-based 
division of responsibilities within the households.  
 
Moving further, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) find that the different preferences 
translate into gender-specific policy choices. To study the effect of an exogenous increase in 
female leaders, the authors use as a natural experiment an amendment made to the 
Constitution of India which required the states both to devolve more power over expenditures to 
the local village councils as well as reserve one-third of all positions of chief for women. Since 
the quota was randomly implemented, the authors can isolate the effect of a female leader by 
comparing the type of public goods provided in local village councils with a female chief to the 
type of public goods provided in councils without a female chief.  
 
The evidence suggests that women invest more in infrastructure that is directly in 
accordance with the voiced complaints. In West Bengal, where women complained more often 
than men about water and roads, councils with a reserved female chief were more likely to 
invest in both water and roads. In Rajasthan, in contrast, where women complained more about 
water, reserved councils were more likely to invest in water than in roads. While the study also 
found that the women in reserved seats—given the disadvantaged initial position—were less 
experienced and had less ambition, lower political prospects, and a lower socioeconomic status, 
the authors employ a range of corroborating tests to rule out that the public goods investments 
are driven by these differences.  
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2. Governance: Female Empowerment and Corruption 
 
The gender-specific differences in governance are observed in a wide range of related contexts. 
Swamy et al. (2001) draw upon both micro- and macro-level evidence to demonstrate a robust 
correlation between gender and corruption. The micro-level evidence stems from two data 
sources.  
 
First, the authors draw upon the World Values Survey, repeated individual-level cross-
sectional surveys conducted in a wide range of developed and developing countries, to highlight 
gender differences in the response to hypothetical questions regarding the corrupt and criminal 
behavior. While 77.3% of women responded that bribery is never justified, the share is 
significantly lower for men at 72.4%. These differences persist when broken down by countries, 
as well as controlling for a range of observables such as age, education, marital status, religious 
affiliation, and labor force participation. 
 
Second, the authors complement the preliminary evidence using World Bank enterprise 
survey data covering 350 firms from Georgia, showing that firms owned or run by men are 
significantly more likely to be involved in bribery. While male-headed firms reported to have 
provided “unofficial payments” to officials in 12.5% of the cases, the frequency is once more 
significantly lower for female-headed firms at 4.6%. Again, these differences persist when 
controlling for observable firm-level heterogeneity, such as firm size, sector, or education level 
of the manager.  
 
In terms of macro-level evidence, the authors draw upon subjective cross-country 
measures of corruption from the Political Risk Services and Transparency International to 
investigate the relationship between corruption and proxies for female empowerment. 
Consistent with the micro-level evidence, the authors find that countries with a larger share of 
women participating in the labor force, holding parliamentary seats, or occupying senior 
positions in governments have significantly lower levels of corruption. These differences persist 
even after controlling for country-level differences in income (gross domestic product per 
capita), education, religion, and other socioeconomic measures. The same conclusion is found 
in Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001).  
 
Despite the robust correlation, however, it is not clear how to interpret the strong 
correlation. Given the observational data, there are a wide range of possible confounds that 
could drive the association. To the extent that women are less likely to admit or acknowledge 
corruption, the differential micro-level results may be driven by reporting biases. In addition, 
even though the authors control for sector and firm size, it is likely that female-headed firms are 
systematically different from male-headed firms. Similarly, the macro level may be subject to 
reverse causality as more developed countries tend to both have lower levels of corruption and 
higher levels of female empowerment. If so, the robust correlations per se do not have 
convincing policy implications.  
 
Indeed, it is often argued that the observed differences are less likely to be driven by 
inherent biological gender differences but differences in socialization, differential access to 
social networks (e.g., old boy networks), or experience with corrupt practices. If so, it is likely 
that these differences diminish in an ongoing learning process, in which case the gender 
dimension is ultimately an irrelevant dimension to explain differences in governance and 
corruption (Swamy et al. 2001; Duflo 2012).  
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The recent paper by Afridi and Sharan (2013) documents how the quality of governance 
changes as female policy makers gain experience over time. Extending the work by 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), the authors examine if and how political reservations for 
women in village councils impact the delivery of a large-scale antipoverty program, the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). 
 
The authors draw upon a household survey covering a sample of 1,500 households 
across 300 village councils in Andhra Pradesh, exploiting the quasi-random assignment of the 
reserved village councils to test whether village councils reserved to be headed by a woman 
perform significantly different than unreserved village councils. Controlling for observables, the 
cross-sectional evidence suggests that households in village councils reserved for female heads 
are more likely to report having experienced corruption and poor quality delivery of the NREGA 
program. The probability of being asked to pay a bribe to obtain a NREGA job card is 6% higher 
in village councils reserved for a female head than in unreserved councils. Similarly, households 
applying for the NREGA program are significantly more likely to experience delays.  
 
Given the quasi-random assignment of the reserved village councils, the differences are 
indeed likely to be driven by village councils reserved for female heads and additional data 
provide an explanation for a mechanism that drives the differences observed. The data suggest 
that reserved village council heads are recruited from a different pool than heads from 
unreserved village councils. Reserved village council heads are significantly likely to be younger 
and less educated. In addition, they are also more likely to have no prior political experience 
and often rely on the assistance of a friend or relative to carry out their official duties. Indeed, 
allowing for heterogeneous effects by interacting the treatment (i.e., being assigned to a 
reserved village council) with measures of experience, the interactions then suggest that the 
negative effect of a female village council head is substantially attenuated for (ex ante) more 
experienced reserved village council heads. This suggests that it may not be gender per se but 
lack of experience of the female village council heads that drives the differences in quality.  
 
If the differences are indeed driven by lack of experience, a natural test would be to 
examine whether the treatment effect diminishes over time. The authors test this mechanism by 
drawing upon the NREGA social audit data covering 2006–2010. The panel structure enables 
the authors to control for subdistrict-level time-invariant heterogeneity and follow the dynamics 
to examine if the treatment effect—when interacted with the annual dummies—declines 
significantly in line with prediction. Indeed, the authors find corroborating evidence in favor of 
experience and the learning mechanism. The result survives a range of robustness checks 
where the authors allow for district-specific time trends and rule out several alternative 
mechanisms by proxying for potentially relevant omitted variables.  
 
3. Discussion 
 
Research in recent years has accumulated evidence in a wide range of contexts suggesting that 
gender matters for the effectiveness of public service delivery and governance. There is also 
encouraging evidence that quotas (and hence increased female political representation) and 
female role models have a long-lasting impact on the aspirations of younger cohorts (Beaman  
et al. 2012; Iyer et al. 2012).  
 
Unfortunately, little research has convincingly offered answers to why women are less 
corrupt than men. A recent laboratory experiment conducted by Rivas (2013), for example, 
reconfirms that women are less likely to choose to take part in corrupt actions but also finds that 
both male and female participants expect women to be less corrupt—suggesting that these 
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differences may be driven by social norms and established beliefs about the behavior of given 
groups.  
 
More generally, gender is only one of the many dimensions one could target (e.g., 
ethnicity or other minority characteristics). Even though there is strong empirical evidence that 
gender appears to be a relevant dimension, the open questions as to why and whether these 
differences persist or taper off over time (e.g., through learning or peer effects) suggest that a 
sole focus on improving governance and fostering development through female empowerment, 
while clearly a desirable outcome in its own right, may be too narrow.  
 
As before, examining the incentive mechanisms at play may be more effective than 
assuming that certain subgroups are as such conducive or unfavorable to development. In the 
case of Duflo (2003) and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), for example, the welfare effect is 
ambiguous. While the cash transfers studied in Duflo (2003) benefited the girls, the intervention 
showed no improvements for boys. Similarly, while Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) show that 
councils with reserved seats were more likely to provide public goods demanded by women, the 
effectiveness of the policies would ultimately need to be evaluated based on aggregate welfare 
changes. Indeed, the recent contribution by Afridi and Sharan (2013) provides more nuanced 
evidence that it may not be gender per se but lack of experience that explains observed 
differences in governance across village councils reserved for women and unreserved councils.  
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper reviewed current trends in public service delivery across Asia, paying particular 
attention to the progress made since the World Development Report 2004. Nine years later, the 
current trends reveal a mixed pattern: while some Asian countries have considerably improved 
their quality of public service delivery, other Asian countries have fallen back or stagnated. A 
direct comparison with more developed regions suggests that there still remains substantial 
scope for improvements. Moving to the subnational level, the evidence surveyed suggests that 
there still remain large within-country differences that sometimes even dwarf cross-country 
differences, pointing to further redistributional challenges ahead. 
 
Based on the conceptual framework of the World Development Report 2004, we then 
highlighted the various frictions that may impede an efficient delivery of public services. First, in 
the presence of fractionalization and competing interests, citizen-clients may not be able to 
voice their preferences about the type of public goods (public choice problem). Second, 
government and policy makers may pursue their own interests, responding to clientelist appeals 
and diverting resources away for nonproductive use (principal-agent problem). Finally, 
contracted providers may further aggravate the principal-agent problem. Symptoms of such 
frictions are manifest in many developing countries: high absence rates, long waiting times, 
differential treatment, and embezzlement of public funds for private gain.  
 
Based on a literature survey, we documented the magnitudes of these frictions 
empirically and provided case study evidence on how empowerment can directly and indirectly 
improve the quality of service delivery. The mechanism that translates empowerment into better 
outcomes is either “voice” or “exit.” In our review, interventions that strengthen the capability of 
the citizen-clients to monitor and sanction service providers have proven very effective in 
improving public service delivery outcomes. Empowering the citizen-clients to exit—by either 
“voting with their feet,” or pursuing outside options—can also improve service delivery by 
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strengthening the bargaining power of the poor. Finally, the studies have also highlighted the 
importance of reconciling the often competing interests various stakeholders face.  
 
Given the diversity of countries across Asia, the extent to which the interventions 
reviewed can be easily replicated and scaled up in other areas may be limited. Indeed, the wide 
range of different interventions employed to empower citizen-clients illustrates that there may 
not be a single panacea that solves the public service delivery problem. Instead, the willingness 
to experiment and creatively adjust policies to the local context appears to be crucial to the 
success of public service delivery. 
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